We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...

We study the voluntary revelation of private information in a labor-market experiment where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker׳s payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further revelation. Such unraveling can...

Im Jahr 2010 wurde eine Reform des Finanzierungsmodells für den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk beschlossen. Mit Wirkung zum 01.01.2013 trat der Rundfunkbeitragsstaatsvertrag (RBStV) in Kraft, der die bisherige geräteabhängige Rundfunkgebühr durch einen geräteunabhängigen Beitrag ersetzt....

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...

We elicit the willingness to sell personal data (contact information, Facebook details, preferences) in laboratory experiments, using a BDM and take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our experiments are novel in that (i) the experiments are incentivized, (ii) the focus on privacy issues is salient, and...

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payoff, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...

The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure raises its downstream rivals' costs is the subject of much controversy in the theoretical industrial organization literature. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that,...

This paper analyzes vertical cross-shareholding, that is, the mutual holding of a minority of shares between vertically related firms. First, we explore the issue in a game-theoretic model and show that cross-shareholding is sufficient to obtain efficient outcomes. We then test the model's...

We analyze the impact of mergers in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies. Treatment variables are the number of firms (two, three) and the distribution of industry capacity (symmetric, asymmetric). Consistent with a dynamic collusion model, we find that, even though they are more...

We analyze competition between workers in a gift-exchange experiment where two workers are hired by the same employer. In the competition treatment the two employees simultaneously choose their effort whereas in the baseline treatment competition cannot occur since there is only one employee per...