Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary monetary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination in a baseline treatment, the efficiency increases...

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination, the efficiency increases substantially after introducing an ex post...

This paper investigates experimentally whether risk attitudes are stable across social contexts. In particular, it focuses on situations where some resource (for instance, a position, decision power, a bonus) has to be allocated between two parties: the decision maker can either opt for sharing...

Many adults have an overly pessimistic view of old age because they fail to correctly predict their ability to hedonically adapt to old-age health related problems. A standard utility model where the marginal utility of health is higher at a lower level of health predicts that this overly...

We propose an experimental method whose purpose is to induce selfish behavior in games for a broad class of social preferences. It provides a theoretical framework for testing game theoretical predictions by confronting subjects with a commonly known payoff matrix actually representing their...

This paper investigates how people value choice. The experiment consists of eliciting subjects' willingness to accept for various choice sets. This approach allows us to assess whether prior to making their decision, people appreciate a wider set of options or not. In contrast with the existing...