Using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1999-2005 we empirically investigate the politics involved in IMF … find inflation forecasts are systematically biased downwards for countries with greater IMF loans outstanding relative to … GDP, indicating that the IMF engages in defensive forecasting. Countries with a fixed exchange rate regime also receive …

Using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1999-2005 we empirically investigate the politics involved in IMF … find inflation forecasts are systematically biased downwards for countries with greater IMF loans outstanding relative to … GDP, indicating that the IMF engages in defensive forecasting. Countries with a fixed exchange rate regime also receive …

Using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1999-2005 we empirically investigate the politics involved in IMF … find inflation forecasts are systematically biased downwards for countries with greater IMF loans outstanding relative to … GDP, indicating that the IMF engages in “defensive forecasting.” Countries with a fixed exchange rate regime also receive …

Using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1999-2005 we empirically investigate the politics involved in IMF … find inflation forecasts are systematically biased downwards for countries with greater IMF loans outstanding relative to … GDP, indicating that the IMF engages in “defensive forecasting.” Countries with a fixed exchange rate regime also receive …

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using … temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political … the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership. …

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using … temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political … the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership. …

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using … temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political … the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership. …

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using … temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political … the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership. …

International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF … about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is … softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council. …

another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the …