The sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens' preferences for income redistribution. They are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its uses (the unemployed, old-age pensioners, people...

In this paper, we elicit preferences of Swiss citizens for the allocation of income redistribution to different uses through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008. Neustadt and Zweifel (2009} provide an estimate of the total desired amount of income redistribution as a share of...

In a perfectly competitive market with a possibility of technological innovation we analyze guaranteed feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables from a dynamic efficiency and social welfare point of view. Specifically, we model decisions about the technological innovation with convex costs...

In this paper, we elicit preferences for the allocation of income redistribution to different uses through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed with a representative sample of Swiss citizens. The total desired amount of income redistribution is estimated as a share of disposable income....

We elicit preferences for the allocation of public budget to groups of recipients through a discrete choice experiment performed with a representative sample of Swiss citizens. The total desired amount of income redistribution as a share of GDP and its allocation across groups of recipients are...

The objective of this paper is to measure preferences for income redistribution through the public budget when recipients differ in terms of their 'degree of merit' (such as the working poor) and their nationalities. A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was performed involving a representative...

This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the...

This paper considers bounded-memory players in a coordination game, who imitate the most successful remembered actions. With exogenous inertia, risk-dominant equilibria are selected independently of the length of memory. Without inertia, Pareto-dominant equilibria arise when memory is long enough.

We prove the existence of equilibria in games with players who employ abstract (non-binary) choice rules. This framework goes beyond the standard, transitive model and encompasses games where players have non-transitive preferences (e.g., skew-symmetric bilinear preferences).

-