We show and explain how generosity beyond that explainable by social preferences can manifest in bargaining. We analyze an ultimata game with two parties vying to coalesce with a randomly chosen proposer. They simultaneously demand shares of the surplus. The proposer must then make an offer that...

Consider a government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) who can collaborate to provide a public good using physical assets. Who should be the owner of the assets if the NGO can make non-contractible investments? In the literature it has been argued that whoever has a larger valuation of...

We study the problem of dissolving an equal-entitlement partnership when the objective is to minimize maximum regret. We initially focus on the family of linear-pricing mechanisms and derive regret-optimizing strategies. We also demonstrate that there exist linear-pricing mechanisms satisfying...

Contrary to most countries, the recruitment of assistant professors in France is centralized: recruitment committees submit a ranking of candidates to the Ministry of Education, the candidates submit their own ranking over the faculties that rank them and the Ministry compute the final match...

This paper proposes a novel solution for the n agent cake cutting (resource allocation) problem. We propose a negotiation protocol for dividing a resource among n agents and then provide an algorithm for allotting portions of the resource. We prove that this protocol can enable distribution of...

We relate the pricing policy of the firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational backlash if it reneges. This allows the firm to effectively commit to...

This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con- straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub- game Perfect Equilibria of these games...

We analyze the influence of unsecured debt (subdebt) on risk-shifting in banks whose assets are risky debt claims. We assume that the stockholders and subdebt-holders jointly decide on risk-shifting. We show that replacing part of the stock with subdebt: (1) leads to fewer risk-shifting events,...

Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage...

We report results from two different settings of a 3-player ultimatum game. Under the monocratic rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the democratic rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then extracted. A majority vote is required to...