This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of … a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the … core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence …

the complete risk management process. An Example from a mechanical engineering company is used for the final validation of …

cooperative games. We also include a brief discussion of the core of tree games. …

core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric … grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure. …

We consider a decentralized, two-echelon supply chain where the upper echelon --the supplier-- bears the inventory risk … not be in the core. Even when they satisfy all the stability properties, including membership in the core, they may be … perceived unfair since a player's allocation can exceed his contribution to the total supply chain profit. In addition to …

coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and … only if the completion of the game is balanced. The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the … coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core. Second, it is shown that the full core of a completion …

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide … whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when …