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In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. This paper examines the case in which the bidder is better informed about the quality of his match with the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222623
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However, information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. We consider the case in which each bidder observes the quality of his match with the seller but the seller does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222624
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222625
Several new auction formats are spreading over the Internet. They have usually the aim of raising revenues by … price. The aim of this paper is to study a format of descending price auction with hidden starting price and endogenous … price decrease. In this format, usually known as price reveal auction, the price is hidden and players have to pay a fee to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015230000
Several new auction formats are spreading over the Internet. They have usually the aim of raising revenues by … price. The aim of this paper is to study a format of descending price auction with hidden starting price and endogenous … price decrease. In this format, usually known as price reveal auction, the price is hidden and players have to pay a fee to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015232377
This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions in independent private value envi- ronments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for sub- mitting a bid,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015233671
This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there always exists an equilibrium for this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015233694
mechanism is proposed for the first time: a truthful multi-unit Vickrey-Dutch auction of callable tokens (i.e., a new hybrid … security of tokens packaged with callable warrants). Truthful bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy and the auction … the auction and its underpricing. An implementation demonstrates its practical viability. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015257417
mechanism is proposed for the first time: a truthful multi-unit Vickrey-Dutch auction of callable tokens (i.e., a new hybrid … security of tokens packaged with callable warrants). Truthful bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy and the auction … the auction and its underpricing. An implementation demonstrates its practical viability. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015257860
I solve a first-price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions and known valuations for one object … distributions, with asymmetric budget distributions, a second-price auction can yield a strictly higher revenue than a first …-price auction. Under an additional assumption, I derive the unique equilibrium utilities and bid distributions of both bidders in an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015261393