A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore non-concession intimidates the opponent...

The efficiency of resource allocation is often analyzed in static frameworks with a focus on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the willingness to pay among users. When the resource is durable in nature, the temporal heterogeneity could be important in assessing the efficiency properties of...

The efficiency of resource allocation is often analyzed in static frameworks with a focus on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the willingness to pay among users. When the resource is durable in nature, the temporal heterogeneity could be important in assessing the efficiency properties of...

The efficiency of resource allocation is often analyzed in static frameworks with a focus on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the willingness to pay among users. When the resource is durable in nature, the temporal heterogeneity could be important in assessing the efficiency properties of...

This paper studies the effectiveness, competition structure and welfare effect of the tariff imposed on imported cars in China's automobile market. Our empirical findings suggest that the tariff cannot switch entire demand for imported cars to domestic cars: the tariff decreases sales of...

This paper empirically tests the bottleneck co-ownership theory presented in Boffa and Panzar (2012) by using data in the US airline industry. We present a structural model of codesharing between major airlines and regional airlines. The empirical evidence in this study supports the bottleneck...