We study transparency and reputation in a stylized investment game in which two senders interact with a receiver in a linear network. We analyse how ex-ante information (compatible with receiver’s reputation building) and ex-post information (making the receiver’s decisions transparent) make...

Feedback interventions are considered a promising instrument to promoteenergy conservation among households and thus, to mitigate climate change. Need. However,it remains unclear whether their effectiveness can be increased by incentivizing thepursuit of energy-savings goals. In this paper, we...

This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly...

We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit-rating agency. It involves up-front payments of issuer-fees and direct publication of requested ratings. Due to pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings, the...

We use data from the Trajectoires et Origines survey to analyze the labor-market outcomes of both second-generation immigrants and their French native counterparts. Second-generation immigrants have on average a lower probability of employment and lower wages than French natives. We find however...

Pay‐for‐performance has been enjoying a growing popularity among healthcare policy makers. It attempts to tie physician payment to quality of care. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the effect of pay‐for-performance on physician provision behavior and patient benefit....

This paper experimentally tests the relation between subjects' competitiveness and bargaining behavior. Bargaining is investigated in a demand-ultimatum game, where the responder can request a share of the pie from the proposer. The results show that highly competitive proposers earn less, since...