This note demonstrates that it is easily possible to compute technological parameters out ot national income acconting data in the presence of bargaining in the labor market. Applying the method to US data, we obtain that the output elasticity with respect to capital exceed 0.5.

We use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard and holdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargaining power balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment, profits and rents....

This paper proposes a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity. In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, effort, and thus productivity, must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of effort. The...

The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences and wealth inequality on aggregate economic outcomes. We investigate how different manifestations of other-regarding preferences affect incentive contracts at the microeconomic level and how these in turn translate into...

In this study, we examine two adjudication methods designed to resolve disputes between principals and agents concerning bonus payments in relationships characterized by moral hazard and where the parties have been forced to use soft, imprecise, and subjective information to align incentives....