The Trust Game describes a situation where mutually beneficial trade is endangered by opportunistic exploitation. In the Trust Game with Banks this dilemma can be avoided by banks guaranteeing that sellers will be paid. This outcome is, however, not the only possible solution. Bank interference...

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects? certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is...

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes...

This paper provides a systematic analysis of individual attitudes towards ambiguity, based on laboratory experiments. The design of the analysis allows to capture individual behavior across various levels of ambiguity, ranging from low to high. Attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards...

This paper provides a systematic analysis of individual attitudes towards ambiguity, based on laboratory experiments. The design of the analysis allows to capture individual behavior across various levels of ambiguity, ranging from low to high. Attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards...

This paper sets up an experimental asset market in the laboratory to investigate the effects of ambiguity on price formation and trading behavior in financial markets. The obtained trading data is used to analyze the effect of ambiguity on various market outcomes (the price level, volatility,...

Most voting models in the literature neglect abstention, but is such a simplification justified? I investigate this question in a model with outside pressure on voters. For sequential voting (e.g., roll call votes), with and without an abstention option, there is a unique subgame perfect...

When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium...

In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the committee chair is said to be more powerful. Players with a veto right are even more powerful still. Similarly, the...