A significant number of women experience physical or sexual violence throughout their lives, with a considerable portion of such incidents occurring in public spaces. Harmful social norms emphasizing men's power over women have been highlighted as one crucial culprit. We study a public festivity...

Over 150 countries allow expatriate citizens to vote in their country of origin. Yet, little is known about their voting behavior and how this is affected by host countries. Using unique micro-data on Chilean expatriates living in Europe, we study how the host country's turnout affects...

In this note we show that the fixed points of a continuous function (or of an upper semi-continuous correspondence, with non-empty and convex values) can be attained as Nash Equilibria of a game with finitely many players.

We propose a specification of a general equilibrium model with securitization of collateral-backed promises and discuss the role of physical collateral to avoid, in equilibrium, pessimistic beliefs about the future rates of default. Promises are pooled in either pass-through securities or...

We consider infinite horizon economies with incomplete financial markets. Securities are in positive net supply and may be infinite-lived. We establish existence of equilibria by requiring borrowing constrains instead of portfolio restrictions..

Introducing assets backed by physical collateral, we extend the Cornet and De Boisdeffre (2002) model of asymmetric information to allow for default. We show that, independently of the financial-informational structure, equilibrium exists.

We state an infinite horizon sequential markets model with real assets in positive net supply and subject to credit risk. By introducing default-dependent borrowing constraints, we show the existence of equilibrium.

We show that in economies without liquidity frictions, but with incomplete financial markets, when agents are infinitely lived and uniformly impatient, money can still be essential (that is, have a positive price in equilibrium) if and only if each agent has binding debt constraints at some node...