We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...

The costs of searching for a job vacancy are typically associated with friction that deters or delays employment of potentially productive individuals. We demonstrate that in a labor market with moral hazard where effort is noncontractible, job search costs play a positive role, whose effect may...

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...

We study sequential search without priors. Our interest lies in decision rules that are close to being optimal under each prior and after each history. We call these rules robust. The search literature employs optimal rules based on cutoff strategies, and these rules are not robust. We derive...

This paper studies optimal decision rules for a decision maker who can consult two experts in an environment without monetary payments. This extends the previous work by Holmström (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) who consider environments with one expert. In order to derive optimal...

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show...

In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show...

When should one pay for delivery of a good if there are no institutions? We suggest to break up the transaction into many small rounds of investment and payment. We show that the efficient investment can be implemented in an epsilon-subgame perfect equilibrium for any given epsilon if the invest...

The first section briefly summarizes previous results in the literature. In the second section the concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is generalized for games with equivalent strategies. Dynamic stability results equivalent to the ones for the traditional definition of an ESS are...

Consider a decision maker who must coordinate his decision with the occurrence of some phenomenon. In order to behave "optimally," the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the phenomenon must be learned. However, there are natural bounds on the capabilities of perception. More...