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We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350825
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491446
higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777646
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274917
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599477
Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibrium in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343339
This paper provides a formal analysis on the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity … decisions of network and power plants need to be coordinated. In unbundled markets, firm-internal coordination no longer applies …. We develop a formal approach to examine whether sim- ple information exchange ("cheap talk") could restore coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421001
type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players' types are … different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011533759
Precedents can facilitate successful coordination within groups by reducing strategic uncertainty, but they may lead to … coordination failure when two groups with diverging precedents have to interact. This paper describes an experiment to explore how … such coordination failure can be mitigated and whether subjects are aware of it. In an initial phase, groups were able to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281540
In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are simple and types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set and Bayesian estimators on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319996