We consider Roy's economies with perfectly competitive labor markets and asymmetric information. Firms choose their investments in physical capital before observing the characteristics of the labor markets they will face. We provide conditions under which equilibrium allocations are constrained...

We study the efficiency properties of equilibria in a neighborhood of economies with Pareto optimal (PO) initial endowments, when the number of agents is finitely large. We provide conditions under which, for all the economies in some open neighborhood of the PO reference economy, all the...

With incomplete markets and numeraire assets, there are open sets of economies such that their equilibrium allocations can be improved upon by a reallocation of period zero endowments. This strengthens the classical results on constrained Pareto ineffciency of equilibria in GEI.

We establish that, when the number of agents is sufficiently large, but finite, there are open sets of economies with constrained Pareto inefficient equilibria, and provide a simple sufficient condition for CP inefficiency. We also show that there are open sets of economies with CPO equilibria.

We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in and choose the amount of their sector-specific investments. To enter the...

We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a...

We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in, and choose the amount of their sector-specific investments in human and...

We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a...

Wir untersuchen den theoretischen Fall einer Ökonomie in der zwei verschiedene Ausbildungstypen in der Produktion verwendet werden. Die Arbeitskräfte sind heterogen in Hinblick auf ihre Fähigkeiten und selektieren sich durch unterschiedlich hohe Investitionen in Humankapital in einen der...

Das IAB geht davon aus, dass sich die Arbeits-, Kapital- und Gütermärkte zumindest längerfristig an den Rückgang des Arbeitsangebotes anpassen werden. Die Prognose einer Fachkräftelücke, in welcher Größenordnung auch immer, ist deshalb nicht sinnvoll. Allerdings kann es zu Mismatch auf...