We develop a microfounded model, where agents have the possibility to trade money for government bonds in an over-the-counter market. It allows us to address important open questions about the effects of central bank purchases of government bonds, these being: under what conditions these...

In the post-crisis period, increased regulation of financial intermediaries led to a significant decline in corporate bond market liquidity. In order to stabilize these markets, policy makers recently proposed that the trading of corporate bonds should be more centralized. In this paper, we show...

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of central bank purchases of government bonds by investigating the following three questions: Under what conditions are these purchases socially desirable, what incentive problems do they mitigate, and how large are these...

We integrate an overlapping generations model into a new monetarist framework and show that the Friedman rule is not optimal. This is because inflation makes saving for retirement less attractive, such that young agents optimally choose to increase their consumption at the expense of lower...

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the relationship between monetary policy, money demand, and unemployment. Our model succeeds in replicating the empirical fact of a downward sloping Phillips curve for low inflation rates and an upward sloping curve for high inflation...

Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor-priority rule, which grants priority for transplantation based on deceased organ donor registration status, has proven to be effective in both theory and...

Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We...

Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We...

In monetary models in which agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex-post inefficiency in that some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This inefficiency creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits...

We present a thought-provoking study of two monetary models: the cash-in-advance and the Lagos and Wright (2005) models. We report that the different approach to modeling money - reduced-form vs. explicit role - neither induces theoretical nor quantitative differences in results. Given...