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Ingratiation and favoritism: Experimental evidence

Robin, Stéphane; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, … - 2012

We provide experimental evidence of workers' by opinion conformity and of managers' discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers' performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal payoffs. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282255

When the Victor Cannot Claim the Spoils: Institutional Incentives for Professionalizing Patronage States

Schuster, Christian - 2016

executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory … to explain when executives forsake patronage for merit. The theory exploits exogenous variation in the institutional … comparison of reforms in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and the United States validates the theory. How patronage states are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011535755

(Dis)honesty and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises

Lang, Matthias; Schudy, Simeon - 2023

of transparency in an incentivized experiment. Transparency leads to less promise breaking but also to less generous …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467742

Team Production benefits from a Permanent Fear of Exclusion

Kopányi-Peuker, Anita; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2015

threat of terminating them from the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We extend a standard weakest link experiment with a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288411

Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2012

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291803

Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption game: An experimental analysis

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Haller, Sven; Krüger, Tyll; … - 2010

For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301733

(Dis)honest Politicians and the Value of Transparency for Campaign Promises

Lang, Matthias; Schudy, Simeon Andreas Dermot - 2020

keeping can(not) be observed. We identify the causal effects of transparency in a laboratory experiment. Transparency leads to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012269436

The Tragedy of Corruption

Chen, Yefeng; Jiang, Shuguang; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2016

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559603

Managerial incentives and favoritism in promotion decisions: Theory and field evidence

Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - 2011

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278492

The economics of politically-connected firms

Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2008

Political connections between firms and autocratic regimes are not secret and often even publicly displayed in many developing economies. We argue that tying a firm's available rent to a regime’s survival acts as a credible commitment forcing entrepreneurs to support the government and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300611