We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for data sets composed of state-contingent prices and consumption to be consistent with two prominent models of decision making under uncertainty: variational preferences and smooth ambiguity. The revealed preference conditions for subjective...

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated...

When should one pay for delivery of a good if there are no institutions? We suggest to break up the transaction into many small rounds of investment and payment. We show that the efficient investment can be implemented in an epsilon-subgame perfect equilibrium for any given epsilon if the invest...

We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication...

The first section briefly summarizes previous results in the literature. In the second section the concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is generalized for games with equivalent strategies. Dynamic stability results equivalent to the ones for the traditional definition of an ESS are...

Consider a decision maker who must coordinate his decision with the occurrence of some phenomenon. In order to behave "optimally," the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the phenomenon must be learned. However, there are natural bounds on the capabilities of perception. More...

Consider a finite data set where each observation consists of a bundle of contingent consumption chosen by an agent from a constraint set of such bundles. We develop a general procedure for testing the consistency of this data set with a broad class of models of choice under risk and under...

This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...