In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called linear consistency, together with some kind of standardness for two-person games, imply efficiency, anonymity, linearity, as well as uniqueness of the value. Among others, this uniform treatment...

This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is...

According to the work of Faigle [3] a static Shapley value for games on matroids has been introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1]. In this paper we present a dynamic Shapley value by using a dynamic model which is based on a recursive sequence of static models. In this...

In the classical model of cooperative games, it is considered that each coalition of players can form and cooperate to obtain its worth. However, we can think that in some situations this assumption is not real, that is, all the coalitions are not feasible. This suggests that it is necessary to...

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive...

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive...