We investigate whether, and under which conditions, a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform may yield an employment double dividend, i.e., an improvement of environmental quality and an increase in aggregate employment. Using a model with two market imperfections – a rigid real wage and...

As a part of their competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this game emerge;...

Authors who consider efficient bargaining on the labor market predominantly focus on the Nash-bargaining solution. It seems, however, that actual labor market negotiations between an employers’ federation and a labor union are often characterized by mutual concessions, which may be accounted...

In this paper we investigate two different games of interjurisdictional competition when local governments provide public goods that benefit industry. Governments play a game either in tax rates on mobile industrial capital or in public expenditures. Although the literature suggests that...

We generalize the formula provided by Maurice and Ferguson (1973) for derived factor demand in a monopoly by extending it to cross-price effects and taking into account other variables which may, within an general-equilibrium framework, affect demand, such as income. Hopefully, both features...

Frequently, hope is expressed that a revenue-neutral ecological tax reform may serve as a remedy for both unemployment and pollution. The idea is to recycle the proceeds from green taxes by cutting taxes on labour, thus boosting employment while discouraging polluting activities. We investigate...