We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the …rst LEC’s...

We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partial cross ownership (PCO) structure in the industry. We establish necessary and sufficient...

This paper reviews the Israeli credit card industry and discusses in detail the ongoing attempts by the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) to promote competition in the industry. Currently, these attempts had only limited success: there is still little competition both on the issuing and the...

An injurer’s activity often exposes multiple potential victims to the risk of harm. We show that under negligence—the tort system’s dominant regime—such victims face a collective-action problem in choosing their activity levels. An increase in one victim’s activity level confers a...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for the analysis of policy-makers' choices regarding unilateral exchange rate bands. Exchange rate bands are viewed as the outcome of an optimization problem by a policy-maker whose objective function weighs the level of the real exchange rate...

We construct a comprehensive panel data of 92 publicly traded European utilities over the period 1994-2005 in order to study the relationship between capital structure, regulated prices, and firm value, and examine if and how this interaction is affected by ownership structure and regulatory...