This paper develops a model of dynamic conflict featuring probabilistic winner- take-all outcomes and compares its behavior to a model in which combatants emerge with a share of the conflict spoils. While these two models generate the same behavior in a one-shot game, we find that in a repeated...

The economic literature on conflict employs a static game theoretic frame- work developed by Jack Hirshleifer. We extend this literature by explicitly introducing conflict dynamics into the model. Our specific application is based on two stylized facts. First, conflict often arises over scarce...

The economic literature on conflict employs a static, game-theoretic framework developed by Jack Hirshleifer. The authors introduce conflict dynamics into a model with two rival groups, each dependent on a single contested renewable resource. The model is based on two stylized facts: conflict...

As time passes, renewable resource scarcities are becoming more common. There is increasing evidence that these scarcities are a causal factor in political conflict, especially in developing countries. We present a simple dynamic model of renewable resource and population interaction featuring...

We develop a model of repeated conflict that features probabilistic winner-take-all outcomes and compare its dynamics to the dynamics generated by a similar deterministic model in which combatants divide the conflict spoils. While these models generate the same behavior in a one-shot game, in a...

As NATO expands eastward, Russia has expressed growing concerns over what it sees as a threat to its national security. At the same time Russia is transitioning to a market economy, with the aim of becoming a free trade partner with the West. The question of concern to European nations is; how...

This paper considers a game theoretic framework of repeated conflict over natural resource extraction, in which the victory in each engagement is probabilistic and the winner takes all the extracted resource. Every period, each contesting group allocates its capabilities, or power, between...

We study three corporate nonmarket strategies designed to influence the lobbying behavior of other special interest groups: (1) astroturf, in which the firm covertly subsidizes a group with similiar views to lobby when it normally would not; (2) the bear hug, in which the firm overtly pays a...

Consumers are rarely sure of the exact standard that product labels and other certificates of quality represent. We show that any such uncertainty creates a “Groucho effect” in which seeing that a product has a label leads consumers to infer that the standard for the label itself is not very...