This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to...

Nous étudions l’ouverture à la concurrence d’un bien réseau dans lequel l’opérateur historique, intégré verticalement, gère en monopole l’infrastructure et est concurrencé sur le secteur des services. La qualité du bien réseau est le minimum des qualités de chaque composante....

[fre] Cet article étudie l'aspect stratégique d'un mécanisme décentralisé du choix de la charge d'accès par l'opérateur. On considère un opérateur en monopole sur les infrastructures, mais qui est en concurrence sur les services. On montre alors, dans un cadre de différenciation...

This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to...

Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose sufficiently severe punishments in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We extend results from the literature on optimal collusion by investigating the role of limited liability. We examine all situations in which either...

[eng] Universal Service Obligations and Competition in Networks.. The opening of public networks to competition raises the twofold question of determining which operator is to fulfil the universal service obligations and how the operator’s resultant losses are to be financed. The paper...

Collusion sustainability depends on firms’ aptitude to impose sufficiently severe punishments in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We characterize the ability of oligopolistic firms to implement a collusive strategy when their ability to punish deviations over one or several periods...