We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...

We determine the optimal contract for the regulation of a bureaucratic firm in the case in which the bureaucratic bias is firm's private information. We find that output is distorted upward when the bureaucratic bias is low, downward when it is high, and equals a reference output when it is...

This article has as main objective to evaluate the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs), in particular the eHealth (electronic health), in the implementation of the directive 2011/24/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 9th, on the exercise of patients'...

We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. By bureaucratic we mean that it values output in itself, and not only profit. Three different financing systems are studied - cost reimbursement, prospective payment, and the...

We study regulation of a manager who has a preference for empire-building (high output), in the presence of moral hazard (unobservable effort) and adverse selection (unobservable productivity). We find that the optimal contract is linear in cost, being composed by a fixed payment plus a partial...

We compare the alternative approaches for regulating genetic information in the health insurance market when prevention measures are available. In the model, firms offer insurance contracts to consumers who are initially uninformed of their risk type but can obtain such information by performing...

We derive testable conditions ensuring that the income tax is optimal when agents are ex-ante identical but face idiosyncratic income risk. The optimal tax depends positively on both absolute risk aversion and risk variance and negatively on labor supply elasticity and absolute prudence. The...

We derive testable conditions ensuring that the income tax is optimal when agents are ex-ante identical but face idiosyncratic income risk. The optimal tax depends positively on both absolute risk aversion and risk variance and negatively on labor supply elasticity and absolute prudence. The...

Proliferation is a strategic behavior which follows various logics: the wish for pre-emption is one of these but does not stand alone. Far from it. However, the literature associates almost systematically the question of proliferation to that of pre-emption, in such a way that the interest in...