We study the probability that two or more agents can attain common knowledge of nontrivial events when the size of the state space grows large. We adopt the standard epistemic model where the knowledge of an agent is represented by a partition of the state space. Each agent is endowed with a...

We study the probability that two or more agents can attain common knowledge of nontrivial events when the size of the state space grows large. We adopt the standard epistemic model where the knowledge of an agent is represented by a partition of the state space. Each agent is endowed with a...

We study a general preferential attachment and Pólya's urn model. At each step a new vertex is introduced, which can be connected to at most one existing vertex. If it is disconnected, it becomes a pioneer vertex. Given that it is not disconnected, it joins an existing pioneer vertex with...

We study the emergence of strategic behavior in double auctions with an equal number n of buyers and sellers, under the distinct assumptions that orders are cleared simultaneously or asynchronously. The evolution of strategic behavior is modeled as a learning process driven by a genetic...

Consider a vertex-reinforced jump process defined on a regular tree, where each vertex has exactly b children, with b = 3. We prove the strong law of large numbers and the central limit theorem for the distance of the process from the root. Notice that it is still unknown if vertex-reinforced...

We develop a technique that provides a lower bound on the speed of transient random walk in a random environment on regular trees. A refinement of this technique yields upper bounds on the first regeneration level and regeneration time. In particular, a lower and upper bound on the covariance in...

The first-order approach is a technical shortcut widely used in agency problems. The best known set of sufficient conditions for its validity are due to Mirrlees and Rogerson and require that the distribution function is convex in effort and has a likelihood ratio increasing in output. Only one...

Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change...