Showing 1 - 10 of 152
This Paper shows that over monitoring a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine loyalty and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. This intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we lose the opportunity to learn how the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504367
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515714
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063690
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703754
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005145790
We consider Hotelling location games with global and local players. Global players are active in several markets, while local players act in a single market only. The decisive feature is that global players cannot tailor their product to each market but have to choose a location on the Hotelling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515681
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005485480
We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968347
Abstract We study optimal incentive provision for “knowledge workers�, a crucial resource for many organizations. We augment a standard moral-hazard framework to reflect two key patterns: First, retention is a challenge because workers are free to leave; thereby harming their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099573
This comprehensive Handbook provides a survey of all the major research areas in sports economics written by almost all of the active researchers in this field. It offers not only an accessible insight into the major findings of the literature but also presents some of the world’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011169157