This paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement (FTA) network formation game among N countries. We first explore the static model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable FTA networks. Then, we develop a dynamic model...

This paper considers a non-cooperative R&D network formation game. Instead of concentrating on R&D cooperation among firms, the paper focuses on one-way externality flow in which each firm forms links in the attempt to acquire others' R&D knowledge. It is assumed that a firm has an internal R&D...

This paper considers one-way flow network formation games in which transmission through a series of agents is subject to decay. We analyze the myopic best-response dynamics of network formation games, occasionally perturbed by state-dependent random noises. Specifically, if an agent is isolated...

The paper examines whether bilateral free trade agreements can lead to global free trade. We reconsider the endogenous tariff model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (<CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2006</CitationRef>) who study pairwise stability of free trade networks. We depart from their analysis by adopting the concept of pairwise...</citationref>

In this paper, we revisit the size of stable cartels in a symmetric oligopoly model with a Cournot fringe. Konishi and Lin (1999) make a conjecture on the size of stable cartels. Due to algebra complexity, they test the conjecture by conducting numerical simulations. We provide an analytical...

This paper considers a finite population of agents located within an arbitrary fixed network. Every agent plays a coordination game with his neighbors. If one neighbor's payoff from a specific interaction exceeds his average payoff per interaction, the neighbor is perceived as better performing....

This paper studies the aspiration-based learning dynamics in symmetric normal-form games played at multiple locations. In particular, the aspiration level in one location is linked to the average performances of players in observable locations. With a decentralized information structure, the...

This paper explores the medium-run behaviour of bounded rational players in repeatedly played games when they occasionally experiment or make mistakes. The formal analysis introduces a hierarchical structure of limit sets to characterize the most possible medium-run behaviour over gradually...