We introduce a new class of cooperative games where the worth of a coalition depends on the behavior of other players and on the state of nature as well. We allow for coalitions to form both before and after the resolution of uncertainty, hence agreements must be stable against both types of...

Local routing protocols in scale free networks have been extensively studied. In this paper we consider a wireless contextualization of this routing problem and analyze on the one hand how cooperation affects network efficiency, and on the other hand the stability of cooperation structures....

An electrical transmission network consists of producers, consumers and the power lines connecting them. We build an ideal (lossless) DC load ow model as a cooperative game over a graph with the producers and consumers located at the nodes, each described by a maximum supply or desired demand...

In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed...

One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts. This is ensured by a set of rules slightly more premissive than those laid out in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the...

Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualied majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a well-known public figure...

Az új választási törvény egyik célja a korábbinál igazságosabb választási körzetek kialakítása. Ezt a Velencei Bizottság választási kódexében megfogalmazott ajánlásokhoz hasonló, bár azoknál némileg megengedőbb szabályok révén biztosítja. A szabályok rögzítik a...

There lies a network structure between fixed tree and minimum cost spanning tree networks that has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game theoretic perspective, namely, directed acyclic graph (DAG) networks. In this paper we consider the cost allocation game defined on...

In this note, we give a straightforward and elementary proof of a theorem by Aumann and Maschler stating that in the well-known bankruptcy problem, the so-called CG-consistent solution described by the Talmud represents the nucleolus of the corresponding coalitional game. The proof nicely fits...