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The existence and nature of ohysiician agency : evidence of stinting from the British NHS

Chalkley, Martin (contributor); Tilley, Colin (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002024046

Auditing without commitment

Khalil, Fahad - In: The Rand journal of economics 28 (1997) 4, pp. 629-640

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001231005

Contracts and productive information gathering

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - In: Social organization and mechanism design : …, (pp. 163-183). 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001463006

Contracts and productive information gathering

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - In: Games and economic behavior 25 (1998) 2, pp. 174-193

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001379404

Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Crémer, Jacques - In: Journal of economic theory 81 (1998) 1, pp. 163-200

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001244922

Input versus output monitoring : who is the residual claimant?

Khalil, Fahad - In: Journal of economic theory 66 (1995) 1, pp. 139-157

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001184200

Collusive auditors

Khalil, Fahad - In: The American economic review 85 (1995) 2, pp. 442-446

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001188928

Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000645707

Contracts and productive information gathering

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000645709

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad (contributor); Martimort, David (contributor); … - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003113311