We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....

We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....

In a wide range of circumstances, relational contracts can enable strategies that might not otherwise be possible. While most studies focus on the maintenance and performance of existing relational contracts, this paper explores the origins of interfirm relational contracts, focusing on how...

We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress....

Institutional economists have frequently cited trucks as prototypical user-owned assets, due to the perceived generic nature of such vehicles and the difficulty of monitoring their treatment by drivers. These scholars have consequently predicted a high prevalence of owner-operator drivers who...

We exploit a historical setting that offers an unusually clean test of the relationship between asset ownership and management incentives: captain ownership of vessels engaged in transatlantic shipping during the 18th century. Although contingent compensation aligned incentives between captains...