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Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information

Fagart, Marie-Cécile - In: Annales d'économie et de statistique (1996), pp. 1-27

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001218908

Optimal contract with random auditing

Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Souam, Saïd - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001446745

Auditing policies and information systems in principal-agent analysis

Fagart, Marie-Cécile (contributor); … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001743388

Wealth effects, moral hazard and adverse selection in a principal-agent model

Fagart, Marie-Cécile - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001680693

Auditing policies and information systems in a principal-agent model

Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001669711

Hostility in Teams and Hidden Action

Roussey, Ludivine; Fagart, Marie-Cécile - 2022

This paper studies how moral feelings (hostility or altruism) modify incentive contractsin the Holmström and Milgrom (1990) multi-agent moral hazard model. One agentfeels altruism or hostility towards the other. His objective function is assumed to be aweighted sum of the two certain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014078698

The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money

Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Fluet, Claude - In: Journal of mathematical economics 49 (2013) 1, pp. 7-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009707602

Ranking contingent monitoring systems

Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 53 (2007) 9, pp. 1501-1509

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003563482