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Persuasion meets delegation

Kolotilin, Anton; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011912659

Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011783242

Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011583422

Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 85 (2017) 6, pp. 1949-1964

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011791640

Persuasion meets delegation

Kolotilin, Anton; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 93 (2025) 1, pp. 195-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015401149

On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - In: Economic theory 76 (2023) 4, pp. 1051-1067

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426084

Eliciting information from a committee

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 2049-2067

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010196166

Eliciting information from a committee

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2012

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009517819

Optimal quality certification

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013369916

Optimal limited authority for principal

Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hao; Li, Wei - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2344 - 2382

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257930