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Venture capitalists as principals : contracting, screening, and monitoring

Kaplan, Steven N.; Strömberg, Per - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001569204

Venture capitalists as principals : contracting, screening, and monitoring

Kaplan, Steven N.; Strömberg, Per - In: The American economic review 91 (2001) 2, pp. 426-430

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001585312

Why are buyouts levered? : the financial structure of private equity funds

Axelson, Ulf (contributor); Strömberg, Per (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783413

Venture capitalists as economic principals

Kaplan, Steven N.; Strömberg, Per - In: NBER reporter online (2003/2004) 2, pp. 22-25

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011366877

Why are buyouts levered? : the financial structure of private equity funds

Axelson, Ulf; Strömberg, Per; Weisbach, Michael S. - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 64 (2009) 4, pp. 1549-1582

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874406

Venture Capitalists as Principals : Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring

Kaplan, Steven N. - 2010

Theoretical work on the principal-agent problem in financial contracting focuses on the conflicts of interest between an agent / entrepreneur with a venture that needs financing, and a principal / investor providing funds for the venture. Theory has identified three primary ways that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763175