Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...

Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...

It is a commonly held belief that corporations, in pursuit of short-term profit, typically ignore the interests of the future [see Reich (1983), and Carnoy and Shearer (1980)]. According to this argument, the emphasis on the short-run explains a whole host of problems such as: an eroding...

Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principal agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...

Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to non-optimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...