We introduce a name market into an overlapping generations model to address politician selection and political accountability when officeholders need not stand for re-election. We show that the name market could mitigate both issues. On the one hand, acquiring a good name screens good...

We introduce a name market into an overlapping generations model to address politician selection and political accountability when officeholders need not stand for re-election. We show that the name market could mitigate both issues. On the one hand, acquiring a good name screens good...

This study examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on corporate labor investment efficiency. We find that tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of non-CEO senior executives, lead to inefficient labor investments, measured as the...

This study examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on corporate labor investment efficiency. We find that tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of non-CEO senior executives, lead to inefficient labor investments, measured as the...

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...