This study explores what determines employers' violations of the wage contracts of workers on H-1B temporary work visas, which occur when firms pay those workers below the promised prevailing or "market" wage. A theoretical framework is proposed that predicts more violations during economic...

The results in this article suggest, among other things, a strong association between recruitment choices and starting wages. The theoretical framework motivating the empirical analysis is a wage-posting game in which firms make wage offers and choose recruitment strategies while recognizing a...

The results in this paper suggest, among other things, a strong association between recruitment choices and starting wages. The theoretical framework motivating the empirical analysis is a wage-posting game in which firms make wage offers and choose recruitment strategies while recognizing a...

We present new theory and empirical evidence concerning racial discrimination in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across levels of a job hierarchy, the opportunity cost (in terms of foregone output) of not promoting qualified nonwhite...

In a multi-task, market-based promotion tournament model, under different environments concerning employer learning about worker ability, it is shown that:i) Asymmetric learning in multi-task jobs is a necessary condition for "strategic shirking" (i.e., underperforming on certain tasks to...

We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified nonwhites/non-Asians is...