rents, reducing his incentives to exert effort. The optimal contract controls information rents to improve incentives by … reflects the agent's private ability, a simple equity contract is optimal …

optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the …

optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the …

commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly … restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of … the message spaces of the communication device. An example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one …

the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the …

transmitted to the public through contract litigation. In a career concern framework, the performance of the long-lived seller is … additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract … and eliminates all incentives. Finally, we apply the model to discuss the optimal information disclosure policy of courts …

, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …

uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …