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On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Review of economic design : RED 5 (2000) 1, pp. 59-70

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001498804

Optimal two-object auctions with synergies

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Review of economic design : RED 8 (2003) 2, pp. 143-164

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001800800

Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Economics letters 79 (2003) 2, pp. 247-253

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750945

Risk aversion in first price auctions with common values

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Economics letters 85 (2004) 1, pp. 43-46

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002215456

Competition may reduce the revenue in a first price auction with affiliated private values

Menicucci, Domenico - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 9 (2009) 1, pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009541619

Banning bidders from all-pay auctions

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 29 (2006) 1, pp. 89-94

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003359959

Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Mathematical social sciences 51 (2006) 3, pp. 280-300

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003322708

Harmful competition in all-pay auctions

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Mathematical social sciences 58 (2009) 1, pp. 110-120

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873767

In the basic auction model, the optimal reserve price may depend on the number of bidders

Menicucci, Domenico - In: Journal of economic theory 198 (2021), pp. 1-11

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012818846

Competing Auctions with Non-Identical Objects

Landi, Massimiliano; Menicucci, Domenico; Sarychev, Andrey - 2022

We study a competition model with two sellers that auction non-identical objects, unlike most of the literature on competing auctions. Each bidder has bidimensional private information, his values for the objects, and chooses the auction in which he participates (if any) after each seller has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081638