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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010386045
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Bargaining in standing committees
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining … over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578203
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Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values : theory and experiments
Miller, Luis; Montero, María; Vanberg, Christoph - 2015
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434323
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Power illusion in coalitional bargaining : an experimental analysis
Maaser, Nicola; Paetzel, Fabian; Traub, Stefan - In: SSRN eLibrary (2017)
One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting … weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822445
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Chapter 5. Coalition Formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 239-326). 2015
approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025454
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Dynamic legislative policy making under adverse selection
Anesi, Vincent - 2018
This paper develops a dynamic model of legislative policy making with evolving, privately observed policy preferences. Our goal is to find conditions under which decision rules, which assign feasible policies based on the legislators' preferences, are sustainable in the long run. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011897250
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Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems
Ok, Efe A.; Zhou, Lin - 1999
bargaining theory are also studied …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194820
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Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol
Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017
A new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352