Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set a parameters λ that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters [lamda] that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement...

Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the...

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15],...

Consider a model of bargaining, in which two players, 1 and 2, share a pie of size y. The bargaining environment is described by a set of parameters that may affect agents' preferences over the agreement sharing, the status quo outcome, or both. The outcomes (i.e., whether an agreement is...

We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Nash program by experimentally comparing the results of "structured" (non-cooperative) demand-based and offer-based mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an ex-ante equilibrium outcome with the results of corresponding "semi-structured"...