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Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366

Assignment games with externalities and matching-based Cournot competition

Chen, Bo - 2013

existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational … marginal effects of technology and human capital, the PAM is still a rational stable matching. However, if the substitutive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

The alternating offers game due to Rubinstein (1982) had been used by Binmore (1980) and by Binmore et.al. (1986) to provide via its unique subgame perfect equilibrium an approximate non-cooperative support for the Nash bargaining solution of associated cooperative two-person bargaining games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680

On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game

Duman, Papatya - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000646

Sequential bargaining with pure common values

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373492

Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373493

Foundations for Contest Success Functions

Corchón, Luis C.; Dahm, Matthias - 2008

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the 'type' of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217464

The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019277

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159

Endogenizing managerial delegation : a new result under Nash bargaining and network effects

Scrimitore, Marcella - 2019

We reconsider the endogenous choice of delegation to a manager by two down-stream firms in both a Cournot and a Bertrand vertical market with network effects. An upstream monopolist charges a two-part tariff for a crucial input. By applying the Nash solution in a centralized bargaining, we show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112258