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Liquidity, Default and Crashes : Endogenous Contracts in General Equilibrium

Geanakoplos, John - 2003

The possibility of default limits available liquidity. If the potential default draws nearer, a liquidity crisis may … ensue, causing a crash in asset prices, even if the probability of default barely changes, and even if no defaults … subsequently materialize. Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014125051

Chapter 10. Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets

Golosov, M.; Tsyvinski, A.; Werquin, N. - In: Handbook of macroeconomics : volume 2, v. 2A-2B SET, (pp. 725-841). 2016

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287

Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services

Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117

When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?

Major, Iván - 2013

Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955

Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876

The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22

This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent’s hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prudent and able, the principal induces a higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217

The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives

Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo - 2018

Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048

Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Gershkov, Alex; Perry, Motty - 2010

This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195069

Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Type-Dependent Reservation Utilities

Packham, Natalie - 2015

In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and - under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020053

Contracting with Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Risk Neutrality : When Does One Size Fit All?

Balmaceda, Felipe - 2018

This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the principal and agent are risk-neutral, there are two actions, adverse selection, moral hazard and limited liability. When the two actions are subject to moral hazard, there is no distortion at the top, the optimal action profile is downward...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927852