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The failure of ancient Greek growth : institutions, culture and energy cost

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Government expenditure and economic growth : a quantitative assessment

Tridimas, George - 1995

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Values, norms, institutions and the prospects for economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe

Voigt, Stefan - In: Journal des économistes et des études humaines : JEEH … 4 (1993) 4, pp. 495-529

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[Rezension von: Market-augmenting government, the institutional foundations for prosperity, Omar Azfar ..., eds]

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The economic effects of judicial accountability : cross-country evidence

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Values, norms, institutions and the prospects for economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe

Voigt, Stefan - 1993

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Innovationspolitik als Ordnungspolitik

Kaufer, Erich; Schmidtchen, Dieter - In: Ökonomische Analyse der rechtlichen Organisation von …, (pp. 1-32). 1994

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The economic effects of judicial accountability: cross-country evidence

Voigt, Stefan - In: European Journal of Law and Economics 25 (2008) 2, pp. 95-123

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Economic growth and judicial independence : cross country evidence using a new set of indicators

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Economic growth and judicial independence : cross country evidence using a new set of indicators

Feld, Lars P.; Voigt, Stefan - 2003

Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians' preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750292