The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. One of its recommendations was to publish the remuneration of the members of the executive board on an individual basis. We examine the characteristics of the firms that comply with the code requirement. Our...

The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. One of its recommendations was to publish the remuneration of the members of the executive board on an individual basis. We examine the characteristics of the firms that comply with the code requirement. Our...

We test the hypothesis that the marginal benefit of investment in investor relations (IR) is greater in countries where capital market institutions are generally less developed and tailored to a more concentrated ownership structure. We use a large panel of survey-based annual IR rankings of...

Using a panel of survey-based annual investor relations (IR) rankings of European companies, we provide evidence suggesting that the marginal benefit of IR is greater in countries with capital markets that are less outside-shareholder oriented. For firms located in these countries, we find that...

This paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984-2005. While the concentration of control does not have an effect on the...