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Folk theorem with communication

Obara, Ichiro - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 1, pp. 120-134

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003812274

Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games

Kandori, Michihiro; Obara, Ichiro - In: International Journal of Game Theory 34 (2006) 4, pp. 475-493

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375679

Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005

We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are .close. to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082

Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games

Kandori, Michihiro; Obara, Ichiro - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 34 (2006) 4, pp. 475-493

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003398038

Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication

MacLean, Richard P.; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014448449