The paper deals with a cooperative game theory analysis of the economics of international agreements on climate change.

This paper provides a framework to study how lobby-government interactions affect environmental R&D programs, government' green policies, firms' profitability, and environmental quality when a Northern country and a Southern country are engaged in trade. In our model, the motivation for an...

This paper provides a framework to study how lobby-government interactions affect environmental R&D programs, government' green policies, firms' profitability, and environmental quality when a Northern country and a Southern country are engaged in trade. In our model, the motivation for an...

This paper shows a new way to approach the analysis of international environmental problems and provides a heuristic 'comparative instrument analysis' using this approach. The conclusion is that economic instruments provide certain desirable properties, especially the achievement of cost...

This paper addresses the question about strategic incentives in international environmental agreements and tries to give a positive description of how the design of the agreement influences the strategic behaviour of potential participants before they enter the treaty. A common feature of the...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

Представлен обзор современных исследований, посвященных применению методов теории игр для анализа различных аспектов инновационной деятельности....

In this paper, we prove that the concept of value traditionally defined in the class of two-person zero-sum games can be adequately generalized to the class of n-person weakly unilaterally competitive games introduced by Kats & Thisse [KT92b]. We subsequently establish that if there exists an...

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.