Showing 1 - 10 of 48,803
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009242907
We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571
We present a model of persuasive signalling, where a privately-informed sender selects from a class of signals with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038885
In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009516790
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011941691
This study investigates the strategic decisions of online platform retailers (OPRs) within government-regulated digital marketplaces, focusing on India's Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC). The ONDC initiative, aimed at democratizing e-commerce, presents both challenges and opportunities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015413853
The abundance of transaction data available on the Internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces. In such a transparent environment, it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals' costs. Is this good news or bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029401
We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587367
This paper extends the team production theory pioneered by Holmstrom (1982) with a team signaling model. In the model, the team's output acts as a signal of the team's ability, and thus is valuable for the team members. The team members will cooperate to some extent to signal a speci fic type,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199519
types quit continuously. The reputation dynamics may exhibit non-monotonicity, with agents who quit either very early or … very late carrying a higher reputation than do agents who quit near the optimal time for low types. Our analysis offers a … unifying explanation for how and when both early and late quitting can enhance reputation and suggests novel welfare and policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015195156