Individuals have a strong tendency to coordinate with all their neighbors on social and economics networks. Coordination is often influenced by intrinsic preferences among the available options, which drive people to associate with similar peers, i.e., homophily. Many studies reported that...

Individual players in a simultaneous equation binary choice model act differently in different environments in ways that are frequently not captured by observables and a simple additive random error. This paper proposes a random coefficient specification to capture this type of heterogeneity in...

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is available. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by specific nonrandomized tests and of course also by lack of more data. These effects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its...

Is the behavior of people consistent with the predictions of the Nash equilibrium and, in particular, the Minimax hypothesis? The existing literature have not reached a consensus about the answer to this question. This paper studies whether the soccer players involved in a penalty kick behave...

Mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using data from nearly half a million serves over 3000 tennis matches, and data on player rankings from the ATP and WTA, we examine whether the...

In experimental economics, where subjects participate in different sessions, observations across subjects of a given session might exhibit more correlation than observations across subjects in different sessions. The main goal of this paper is to clarify what are session-effects: what can cause...

The phenomenon of p-hacking occurs when researchers engage in questionable practices that enable them to report findings as being statistically significant. I offer four models of p-hacking behavior – unconditional, strategic, greedy, and restrained – and explore the implications of each...

In this paper we address the following questions: (i) To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? And (ii) in environments where the hypothesis is falsifiable, to what extent is the observed behavior of voters consistent with sincere voting? We show that...

In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information‐sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When any two agents in the network are connected either...

Building on the sequential identification result of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019), this paper develops estimation and inference procedures for static games of incomplete information with payoff‐relevant unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria. With payoff‐relevant unobserved...