This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Bulgaria and Germany, with different allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid functions, some features of...

This paper presents the results of experiments carried out in two countries, Bulgaria and Germany, with different allocation rules (first- vs. second-price - auction vs. fair division game). The data analysis of the sealed-bid, private value-contests compares the bid functions, some features of...

We conduct experiments on common value auctions with rationing. In each auction, the good is randomly allocated to each of the k highest bidders, at the (k+1)st highest price. As the degree of rationing increases, the theoretical winner's curse decreases, and the equilibrium bid function...

We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in subsequent ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and then charge exogenous participation fees according to the auction price sequences observed in...

In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or to keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing...

“King Solomon's Dilemma” is based on a biblical story and this can be considered as an allocation problem for an indivisible object among two players. An allocation is first-best if a social planner wants to assign the object without payment to the player whose valuation is the highest. We...