Showing 1 - 10 of 15,811
firm must transfer a large part of the surplus to the inactive firm in order to limit pre-emption. Learning; Pre …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636
Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation … the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning … delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421
This paper experimentally investigates social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and …. We find that more efficient observational learning leads to more accurate predictions in the endogenous treatments and … strength. Simultaneous decisions in endogenous ordering avoid observational learning and compensate the higher degree of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009779323
version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607986
Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419870
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526
We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information in the spirit of Wilson (1977)’s ‘anticipatory equilibrium’ by introducing an additional stage in which initial contracts can be withdrawn after observation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316023
This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744297
A mediator, with no prior information and no control over the market protocol, attempts to redesign the information structure in the market by running an information intermediation mechanism with transfers that first elicits information from an agent, and then discloses information to another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865067
We report on an experiment on decentralized markets in the presence of adverse selection. When allowing for costless and non-binding communication (cheap-talk), there exists a partially separating equilibrium that results in a substantially higher efficiency level than the adverse selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969275